Pushing Boundaries: Islamic Feminism in Iran by Aslam, Fatima
Columbia University  
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences  
Human Rights Studies Master of Arts Program  
 
 
Pushing Boundaries: Islamic Feminism in Iran  
 
Fatima Aslam 
Thesis adviser: Joseph Chuman 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  













Since the 1990s, a powerful feminist movement has emerged in Iran led by women who are 
challenging traditional authority and re-interpreting the Quran for themselves. The way this 
movement evolves will determine the future direction and development of the women’s right 
movement in Iran and in the larger Muslim world. In this thesis, I examine the life of two 
influential Iranian Islamic feminists, Shahla Sherkat and Azam Taleghani, in order to understand 
and assess their strategies in terms of expanding women’s rights in Iran.  This paper begins by 
providing a brief discussion of the twentieth century social and political transformation in Iran 
that propelled Sherkat and Taleghani to get involved in the Islamic feminism movement in Iran. 
Next, it discusses how the two women relate Islam with Feminism, how they approached the 
Quran as a basis for reform, and how they expanded the presence of women in the political 
sphere of Iran. Through this thesis, I hope to show that change is happening – and more often 
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 Introduction   
 
“Given the current realities of the Muslim world, in which the Islamists have the upper hand in 
defining the terms of reference for political and gender discourses, I would maintain that only 
those prepared to engage with Islam’s sacred texts and its legal traditions can bring change 
from within.”  
-– Ziba Mir Hosseini, 2006   
 
 In 2003, when Iranian human rights activist and lawyer Shirin Ebadi won the Nobel 
Peace Prize for her efforts to promote the rights of women, she was applauded globally but 
immensely criticized and harassed by the Iranian government1. In Iran, the struggle for women’s 
rights has been fought within a complex religious and patriarchal power structure that severely 
restricts the social and political space given to women. The World Economic Forum ranked Iran 
number 140 out of 1442 nations in terms of the world’s worst country for gender equality where 
women continue to face several legal and social discriminations including forced veiling and 
restrictions on travelling without the written permission of their husbands. The impact of this 
discrimination is evident when one considers that only 16.2 percent of Iran’s women are in the 
workforce, compared with 72.1 percent of men and merely 3.1 percent parliamentary seats held 
by women3. While throughout the 20th century, Iranian women have gone through multiple 
changes in their political and legal status – from the imposed secularization under Reza Shah 
                                                 
1Azadeh Moaveni, “Why Iran Is Targeting Nobel Winner Ebadi” Time  (November 30, 2009)  
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943400,00.html 
2 World Economic Forum. The Global Gender Gap Report (2017), https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-
gender-gap-report-2017. 
3 UN Human Development. Human Development Report (2016), http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report/. 
Table 5: Gender Inequality Index, 215. 
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Pahlavi, and later his son, Mohammad Reza Shah to the conservative religious identity promoted 
under Ayatollah Khomeini - the status and role of women in modern Iran is largely defined by 
the Islamic regime established after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  
The establishment of the Islamic regime in 1979 had two key effects on the rights of 
women in Iran. First, the new regime made it mandatory for all Iranian women to wear the veil in 
public arguing that the Western image of women, which was heavily promoted under the Shah, 
had corrupted Iranian women and destroyed the modesty that is found in Islam4. The veil was 
seen to free “the country of alien ideologies and establish women’s independence from Western 
domination and styles…it is a rejection of all relations and beliefs that reduce her to the level of a 
naked yet sexy doll...and saves her from man’s uncontainable lust5”. In other words, according to 
the new regime, the veil and segregation were essential for the social order of Iranian society. 
While the veil restricted the women in many ways, it also granted them, quite paradoxically, 
increased access to education and public spaces6. Iranian Anthropologist and Activist Ziba Mir-
Hosseini argues that the veil made “public space morally correct in the eyes of traditionalist 
families, it legitimized women’s public presence7.” According to national consensus data, only 
17.42 percent of the female population was literate in 1966 while in 1996 the number increased 
to 74.2 percent8. In addition, Brooking Institute reports that Iranian women are outnumbering 
men two to one in the entering classes of universities9. This trend, as we will learn, is perhaps 
                                                 
4 Nikki R Keddie. "Iranian Women’s Status and Struggles Since 1979." Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 
(2007): 23  http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357968. 
5 Farzaneh Milani. Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992),  
38.  
6 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000) 7. 
7 Ibid 7.  
8 Zahra Mila Elmi, "Educational Attainment in Iran." Middle East Institute (January 2009) 
http://www.mei.edu/content/educational-attainment-iran. 
9 Djavad Salehi Isfahani. "Are Iranian Women Overeducated?" Brookings ( July 28, 2016) 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/are-iranian-women-overeducated/. 
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one of the most positive effect of the Islamization process and one that has altered gender 
discourse in Iran.  
The second key impact of the Islamic Revolution was the enhanced legal discrimination 
faced by women on the basis of gender. One of the revolutionary government’s first acts was to 
suspend the Family Protection Law of 1967 and dismantle Family Courts10. Women not only lost 
their right to file for divorce and gain child custody, but also suffered as restrictions on polygamy 
were removed and marriage age was reduced to nine11. In addition, the Islamic Law of 
Retribution was also approved, which made stoning and flogging a legal punishment for adultery 
and violation of Islamic dress codes. A committee, known as the Council of Guardians, was set 
up and given the task of ensuring that no new law contradicted with Islamic values and law12. 
This Council comprised of twelve male jurists who were selected by Khomeini himself. The lack 
of female representation and the unchecked power gave the Council ultimate authority to strike 
down that most gender-progressive laws on religious grounds and it has not hesitated to use this 
authority over the years13.   
While the freedoms and rights granted to women were severely limited under the Islamic 
Republic, increased access to education and information technology in the 1980s and 1990s led 
to the emergence of a powerful feminist challenge. “It is,” writes Mir-Hossieni, “history’s irony 
that the revolution that brought the clerics into power also sowed the seeds of a new intellectual 
and popular movement.14”  This feminist force is led by women who challenge the 
discriminatory political rhetoric and policies of the regime not with a foreign ideology, but with 
                                                 
10 Keddie, "Iranian Women’s Status and Struggles Since 1979."  23. 
11 Ibid 24.  
12 David E Thaler, Alireza Nader, and Shahram Chubin, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads an Exploration of Iranian 
Leadership Dynamics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010),  29. 
13 Ibid 30.  
14 Ziba Mir Hosseini. "Is Time on Iranian Women Protesters’ Side?" Middle East Research and Information Project. 
(June 2006) http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061606. 
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Islam. Islamic feminism looks towards Islam for gender equality and considers the Quran to be 
compatible with the basic principles of feminism15. Today, Islamic Feminists are engaging 
critically with Islamic texts, opening them up for feminist interpretations, and challenging the 
authority of the religious establishment in order to “win back, inch by inch, the grounds which 
they lost through re-islamization policies in Iran16.”.  
 
Purpose and Significance of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will attempt to answer why and how the participation of Islamic feminists has 
been crucial to advancement of women’s rights in Iran and, additionally, seek to understand the 
various strategies used by these feminists, whether they were successful and how their success 
can be measured. It will focus on the lives of two prominent Islamic feminists, Azam Taleghani 
and Shahla Sherkat, and analyze how their efforts have succeeded in feminizing Iran so much so 
that almost three decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, “not only have women not 
been excluded from public life and politics but their participation has actually increased, 
although in different guises and according to different rules17”. Both as elected politicians and as 
activists working within the Islamic framework, Sherkat and Taleghani struggled for women’s 
rights and their participation in the spheres of power. In conducting an analysis of Taleghani and 
Sherkat’s life, this study hopes to answer the following questions: How are Islamic Feminists 
advancing the rights of women in Iran? Where have they been successful and where have they 
failed? Is Islamic Feminism a useful force for the advancement of women’s rights?   
                                                 
15John L Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press 2003). 
16Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis (London: Zed 
Books, 2002), 11.  
17 Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran, 7.  
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While there are many studies of Islamic feminism as movement, very few of them 
explore the role of “trespassers” in detail. Trespassers is the term given by Hamideh Sedgih to 
women who have a strong affiliation with Islam but “resonate, progressively, the gender 
concerns of secular opponent of women”18. Trespassers are, according to Sedgih, “unfixed and 
changing19” as their views on gender relations have evolved immensely overtime. In this sense, 
Sherkat and Taleghani, who were once strong supporters of Islamic regime, have been two of the 
most influential trespassers in advancing women’s rights in Iran in the last three decades. By 
understanding how Sherkat and Taleghani brought about change while working within an 
Islamic paradigm, the international community along with Iranian feminists, both Islamic and 
secular, can better support the feminist movement in Iran and possibly replicate it in other 
Islamic societies. 
The war on terror, frequently termed as the war against radical Islam, that followed 9/11 
has increased the distance between many Muslims and the international human rights system. 
Many Muslims have come to view the war as one waged against their religion and way of life 
which has led to a hypocritical perception of the human rights system which is seen largely as an 
modern extension of Western colonialism20.  In this atmosphere, Islamic Feminism can be a 
strategic force in promoting grass-root gender reform as it is more likely to find support amongst 
the public and progressive clerics in Islamic societies.  Given the rise of political Islam globally, 
it is crucial for those working for the advancement of women’s rights to develop a deeper 
understanding of the complex religious and political structure present in this region. Isobel 
Coleman, a foreign policy expert and former senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, 
                                                 
18 Hamideh Sedghi. Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 267.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
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argues that “the stability of our world as we know it will likely be determined in this volatile part 
of the globe21” and the struggle for women’s justice is “central to many of the most pressing 
American foreign policy concerns: alleviating poverty, promoting economic development, 
improving global health, building civil society, strengthening weak and failing states, assisting 
democratization, tempering extremism22.” Ultimately, this thesis hope to show that change is 
happening in Iran – and more often than not, it is being led by Muslim women.  
 
Research Methodology  
In order to answer the questions proposed above, research for this thesis was primarily 
conducted on the lives of Shahla Sherkat and Azam Taleghani with a specific focus on three 
areas: their association of Islam with Feminism, approach towards the Quran, and influence in 
political sphere of Iran.  
There are two main reasons that Sherkat and Taleghani were chosen for the purpose of 
this thesis. Firstly, these women come from traditional religious backgrounds and were once 
devout supporters of the Islamic Revolution. The shift in their ideology from supporters of the 
Islamic Republic to one of its most profound critics is worth further examination. Both women 
are willing to face any threat, whether it is the threat of going to jail or being exiled, for a cause 
that they voluntarily committed to. Secondly, as they are prominent figures in Iran there is a lot 
of published material available about their life and activities, particularly primary sources. This 
thesis engages closely with articles written about and by Taleghani and Sherkat along with 
interviews and secondary literature. 
                                                 
21 Isobel Coleman, Paradise beneath Her Feet: How Women Are Transforming the Middle East (Random House 
Trade Paperbacks, 2013), xvii.  
22 Ibid.  
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The research method has primarily consisted of qualitative analytical research based on 
secondary and primary sources. The main sources used in this research to understand Islamic 
Feminism are, Margot Badran’s Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences, Isobel 
Coleman’s Paradise Beneath Her Feet: How Women are Transforming the Middle East and 
Leila Ahmad’s Women and Gender in Islam Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. To 
understand Islamic Feminism specifically in the context of Iran and Teleghani and Sherkat’s role 
within it, the key sources used are Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate 
in Contemporary Iran and “Beyond Islam and Feminism, Sanam Vakil’s Women and Politics in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and Reaction, and Valentine Moghadam’s Modernizing 
Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. For a critique of Islamic Feminism, the 
sources used were Hamideh Moghissi’s Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of 
Postmodern Analysis and Shahrzad Mojab’s “Theorizing the Politics of “Islamic Femenism.” 
Additionally, I have used various journal articles, translations of news articles, interviews of 
Sherkat and Taleghani, and human rights reports.    
 
Literature Review  
As this thesis will attempt to evaluate the work of Islamic Feminist Iran in terms of 
advancing women’s rights, this section will review existing literature on how to define Islamic 
Feminism and place it in the context of human rights. It will also briefly highlight some key 
criticisms of Islamic Feminism as a force to advance women’s rights.  
In her book Paradise Beneath Her Feet: How Women Are Transforming the Middle East, 
Isobel Coleman describes Islamic Feminism as an “important emotional and intellectual 
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stepping-stone—and tactic—to meet the demands of the modern world23.” According to 
Coleman, this movement found its intellectual beginning in the late 19thth century with the rise 
of Muslim scholars who attempted to reform Islamic traditions and meet the needs of modern 
society through the reinterpretation of the basic principles of Islam24. The role of women in an 
Islamic society was one of the most controversial issues that emerged in the modern era as 
Islamic societies faced immense criticism for their treatment of women particularly the existence 
of social seclusion, heavy veiling, and the practice of polygamy. The response of most modern 
Islamic scholars, and Coleman highlights a series of them25, was to acknowledge that the 
oppression of women did in fact exist in the Muslim world, but it had no basis in the Islam. 
These scholars believed that Muslim scholars over the course of Islamic history had developed a 
strong resistance to change, which was to blame for the backwardness of the Islamic community. 
What these reformists were advocating for, however, was indeed a radical notion - that the Quran 
could be revisited and understood in a new light.  
Coleman argues that Islamic feminism is fundamentally an extension of this earlier 
intellectual movement which considers gender equality as a value inherently found in Islam but 
one that is overshadowed by the patriarchal traditions and conservative interpretations promoted 
by the religious establishment26. She sees critical engagement with and reinterpretation of sacred 
Islamic texts as one of the defining characteristics of Islamic feminism: “What many of the men 
and women today are trying to do within Islam is argue that times change, and you have to read 
them [Islamic texts] differently. You have to think about them in the present, not only in the past, 
                                                 
23 Coleman, Paradise beneath Her Feet: How Women Are Transforming the Middle East, 275. 
24 Ibid 41. 
25 Ibid 42-49. 
26 Ibid 40. 
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and find new meanings and new ways to circle that square27.” This ability to work within the 
values of Islam while being able challenge aspects of traditional Islamic orthodoxy allows 
Islamic feminism to have a broader appeal in Islamic societies and succeed where secular 
movements have failed to do so.28 
Margot Badran identifies the goal of Islamic Feminism to be two-fold: to promote the 
Quranic notion of full human equality while dismantling patriarchal ideas and practices 
publicized in the name of Islam29. The first goal, the promotion of full human equality, forms the 
core of Islamic feminism and that, according to her, has not been found in Muslims’ secular 
feminism30. She argues that while secular feminism advocated for gender equality in the public 
sphere and settled for complementary roles in the private, Islamic feminism promotes the notion 
of full equality of humans in all spheres and finds basis for this the Quran31. The second goal is 
to end patriarchal ideas and practices by using Quranic verses to challenge the notion of male 
authority over women, drawing attention to verses that specifically support gender equality, and 
promoting gender-sensitive interpretations of the Quran32. Islamic Feminists, Badran highlights, 
believe that the principle of gender equality in the Quran was overlooked historically by male 
jurists which has resulted in the discriminatory laws and customs. A strong promoter of the 
movement, Badran concludes that “Islamic Feminism stands to benefit us all, Muslims of both 
sexes, as well as non-Muslims living side by side with Muslims everywhere33.”  
                                                 
27 Isobel Coleman, "Islamic Feminists Transforming Middle East”, NPR (April 27, 2010) 
https://www.npr.org/2010/04/27/126309699/islamic-feminists-transforming-middle-east. 
28 Ibid 85. 
29 Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 247.  
30 Ibid 250.  
31 Ibid 250.  
32 Ibid 247.  
33 Ibid 250.  
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In her article “Women in search of Common Ground: Between Islamic and International 
Human Rights Law”, Ziba Mir-Hosseini highlights the parallel rise of both political Islam and 
the international system based on the idea of universal human rights. The consolidation of power 
by the Islamic regime in Iran 1979 was followed months later by adoption of CEDAW in an 
effort to end gender-based discrimination. Mir- Hosseini describes these developments, “as a 
clash between two opposing yet equally powerful frames of reference34.” While the Islamic 
regime set up a legal system based on religion, the international community moved towards a 
universal and secular application of law. However, she argues, that both Islamic and human 
rights law failed to produce real change for women and this propelled scholars and activists to 
search for a middle ground between both these systems35.  
 She considers Islamic Feminism to be the “unwanted child of political Islam36” and an 
urgent response to the increasingly discriminatory political rhetoric and legal system promoted 
by the Islamist regimes. Islamic feminists,  Mir-Hosseini, argues were quick to realize that the 
struggle for women’s rights must be posed within the Islamic framework and this can be done by 
engaging closely with Islamic texts37.  Islamic Feminism is thus, “a gender discourse that was 
and is feminist in its aspiration and demands, yet Islamic in its language and sources of 
legitimacy38.” This internal challenge posed by Islamic Feminists, according to Mir-Hosseini, 
has made it increasingly difficult for the Iranian government to hide under the cloak of cultural 
                                                 
34 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Women in Search of Common Ground: Between Islamic and International Human Rights 
Law” quoted in Anver M. Emon and Mark S. Ellis, Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law: Searching 
for Common Ground? (Oxford University Press, 2012), 292.  
35 Ibid 302.  
36 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "Feminist Voices in Islam: Promise and Potential," OpenDemocracy (November 2012) 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ziba-mir-hosseini/feminist-voices-in-islam-promise-and-potential. 
37 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism." Critical 
Inquiry 32, no. 4 (2006): 629. doi:10.1086/508085.  
38 Ibid 640.  
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relativism and continue to reject international human rights treaties39. While the government 
could dismiss international law and organizations with the argument that they don’t comply with 
religious standards, it is harder to overlook an internal movement that is demanding change. Mir-
Hosseini explains this when she writes, “When the question and demands for change and 
adoption come from inside the tradition, to resolve the crisis, the tradition has to respond, for 
example by adopting a new idea of value and making it inherent to the tradition40.”  
In addition to reforming local tradition, Islamic Feminists in Iran have also developed 
links and established strong global networks of activists in order to support their goals41. A 
prominent example of this is Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice for women in 
Islam that brings together over 250 scholars and activists from different Muslim nations. 
Members of Musawah combine progressive interpretations of the Quran and application of 
universal human rights principles with grass-root activism in order to bring about legal and social 
change in Muslim societies42. As one of the founders of Musawah, Mir-Hosseini the key to the 
movement’s success in Muslim societies is its ability to build a consensus between women’s 
rights activists from different backgrounds -  particularly between secular and religious women – 
and to be able to approach the Quran as a source of empowerment and offer Islamic alternatives 
to the traditional interpretations43. The goal was Musawah was to accomplish this while avoiding 
“those who want to impose patriarchal interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts44” and “those who 
pursue a neo-colonialist hegemonic global project in the name of human rights and feminism45.” 
                                                 
39 Mir-Hosseini quoted in Emon, Ellis and Glahn, 301.  
40 Ibid 302.  
41 Ibid 292.  
42 Ibid 299.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
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While many scholar-activists like Mir-Hosseini have deemed Islamic feminism as an 
important force for the advancement of women’s right in Islamic societies, there are others who 
consider it as an unrealistic and ineffective concept. Shahrzad Mojab, an activist and professor at 
the University of Toronto, views Islamic feminism as a contradiction and a largely 
counterproductive movement46. Mojab argues that Islamic principles are fundamentally 
patriarchal and by using Islam as a force for women’s rights, Islamic feminists indirectly support 
the traditional patriarchal system and the unequal gender relations imposed by Islamist 
authority47. This includes, she highlights, women’s journals such as Zanan headed by Shahla 
Sherkat which advance a progressive re-interpretation of Islamic sources. “Islam”, she writes, 
“cannot be degenderized into a neutral observer of religion48” and for feminist interpretations of 
religious texts to be allowed to lead to reform of the law it would “require either the radical 
revision or discarding of its theological basis49.” In other words, in the case of Iran, the only way 
for women to radical reform is through the dismantling of the Islamic state50.  
In her book, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism , Haideh Moghissi also criticizes 
Islamic feminism as a concept rooted in gender hierarchy that cannot be reconciled with the 
secular and democratic concept of feminism51.” According to Moghissi, the Quran contains a 
highly developed system of gender hierarchy with gender-specific roles and obligations that have 
been translated into the Islamic legal system52. Feminism, on the other hand, is a concept 
grounded on the fact that there should be no discrimination of roles on the basis on gender. This 
poses, according to Moghissi, a fundamental question: “How could a religion based on gender 
                                                 
46 Shahrzad Mojab, “Theorizing the Politics of “Islamic Femenism,” Femenist Review 69 (Winter, 2001): 131. 
47 Ibid 134.  
48 Ibid. 126. 
49 Ibid. 136.  
50 Ibid. 140.  
51 Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis, 126. 
52 Ibid 141.  
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hierarchy be adopted as the framework for struggle for gender democracy and women’s equality 
with men?53” In addition, Islamic Feminism, according to Moghissi, assumes that all Muslim 
women identify with it and this undermines the struggle of many secular voices “which are 
raised against the region’s stifling Islamification process54.”  In other words, Islamic feminism 
does not allow other, possibly more effective, discourses and strategies to operate.  
Although such criticisms are partly justified, this thesis hopes to show the significant 
changes brought forth in Iran through Islamic feminism. While the argument that secularism is 
the ideal system to ensure gender equality is valid, we must move forward with the acceptance of 
the fact that an Islamic regime exists in Iran and the political, legal and social order largely 
operates within an Islamic framework.  International human rights law alone does not speak to a 
majority of Muslim women in Iran and to produce change, one must provide alternative ideas 
and solutions in an a language that is familiar to them. What ultimately matters is how we can 
improve the position of women – and this goal is common amongst both secular and Islamic 
feminists. This thesis attempts to show is that the struggle of Islamic feminism, even if operates 
within the Islamic framework,  has brought forth significant improvements for women and, more 
importantly, has led to a change in the attitudes of Iranians. As Mir-Hossieni writes: “The legal 
gains and losses of women in Iran, and now in Afghanistan and Iraq, testify to the fact that there 
can be no sustainable gains unless patriarchal notions of family and gender relations are debated, 
challenged and redressed within an Islamic framework55.” 
 
Shahla Sherkat and Azam Taleghani: Historical Background 
                                                 
53 Ibid 126.  
54 Ibid 137-138.  
55 Mir‐Hosseini, "Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism."  644. 
 17 
 
Shehla Sherkat was born in 1956 to a traditional middle-class family in the cultural city 
of Isfahan located four hours south of the Iranian capital of Tehran. Like most girl belonging to 
middle-class families, she studied at a traditional Islamic school and wore a hijab from a young 
age56. In an interview with BBC correspondent Jane Howard, Sherkat recalled attending 
elementary school in this dichotomous atmosphere: “He [her father] was very particular about 
the hijab and we even wore our headscarf to school and sometimes the chador too… At the time 
I went to school, there would be girls sitting next to me with miniskirts, but I was never made to 
feel uncomfortable57.”  
The Iran of Sherkat’s childhood was a monarchy under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi who had been aggressively modernizing Iran and promoting its Persian identity at the 
expense of its Islamic one. However, by the end of 1950s, there was an increasing dissatisfaction 
with the Shah’s rule and the level of foreign involvement in Iran. Hence, Sherket, who was still 
relatively young in the 1960s, grew up in a nation that was becoming increasingly closer to its 
Islamic identity.   
Sherkat, in pursuit of a higher education, moved to Tehran and joined the Tehran 
University to pursue her studies in clinical psychology58. The years at Tehran University were 
some of the most formative years of Sherkat’s life as she interacted and worked alongside people 
with whom, at least at the first glance, she had nothing in common except their passion for 
education and politics. It was also in her university years that a grass-root movement against the 
Shah was taking place and she found herself constantly drawn towards this political movement 
                                                 
56 Sanam Vakil, Women and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and Reaction (Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013), 121. 
57 Jane Mary Howard, Inside Iran: Women's Lives, (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2002), 143. 
58 Vakil, Women and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and Reaction, 121. 
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and struggle for women’s rights. She said, “Before the 1979 Revolution, social participation was 
only for the elite or women who were married to power. But the Revolution was a mass 
movement, and as a result many women across social sectors became interconnected. We left the 
four walls of our houses and became participants in new ways59. 
Similar to the traditional upbringing of Sherkat, Azam Taleghani was born in 1944 and 
raised in a traditional household in Tehran. As a child, Taleghani found herself in a household 
that was extremely politically active despite the dangers associated with such involvement60. Her 
father, Ayatollah Said Mahmoud Taleghani, was a prominent cleric who fought against the 
Shah’s regime and believed that modernization must be led by Islamic not Western values. This 
familial atmosphere gave Taleghani both a comprehensive understanding of Islam and a 
progressive outlook. Her father, Ayatollah Taleghani, believed that “women have many skills 
and potential for growth but even they themselves don’t realize their skills and rights61.” He did 
not compel his daughter to wear the veil but instead allowed her to make up her own mind 
Taleghani made the choice to wear the veil and says: “It is only Western propaganda that claims 
the chador is something that causes the degradation of women. It is simply a type of dress. Those 
who believe in tradition keep the chador, just as Indian women wear the sari62.” 
The change in the political environment in Iran set Sherkat and Taleghani on a life-long 
course that they are known for today. In Iran, the atmosphere was changing, as more and more 
young people became involved in the movement against the Shah. Sherkat participated in the 
Islamic Revolution under Khomeini, demonstrating in the streets against the Shah and later 
                                                 
59 Elizabeth M Bucar,  Creative Conformity: The Feminist Politics of U.S. Catholic and Iranian Shi'i Women. 
(Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 146.  
60 Elaine Sciolino, Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran (Free Press, 2005), 110.  
61 Ibid 110. 
62 “Women in Iran Chafe at Role Since the Revolution”, The New York Times, 28 Marchi 1981, 
www.nytimes.com/1981/03/29/world/women-in-iran-chafe-at-role-since-the-revolution.html. 
 19 
working as an editor for a popular local magazine, Zan-e Rouz (Today’s Woman). As the Islamic 
Revolution solidified its power and began to establish its rule, Sherkat became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the conservative manner in which women were viewed by those in power63. As 
a state-sponsored publication, the magazine was supposed to portray women as homemakers and 
much of the approved material revolved around cookery and needlework64. Sherkat, however, 
pushed the magazine to become more feminist by introducing political and religious material 
which included women’s unpaid care work and participation in public life. She describes her 
years as editor of Zan-i Ruz as a decade of enthusiasm, pain, and turmoil, one in which “our 
efforts were directed toward breaking down Jahili (literally meaning ignorant - an Islamic 
designation of pre-Islamic world) traditions and lighting flame in the dark tunnels of stagnation 
and reification65.” These efforts were not appreciated by the Islamic regime and in 1987, Sherkat 
was summoned to court when she published a story about a girl who refused to cover her hair 
and was beaten by the police66. Her refusal to stop publishing stories such as these brought her 
into conflict with the conservative leadership of the magazine, and she was fired after eight years 
with the publication67. 
Before she left, however, Sherkat got permission from the minister of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance to establish a new magazine, Zanan, meaning Women in Farsi. The monthly magazine, 
which was initially based in a small office in Iran, grew to became the most widely read and 
influential publication on women’s issues in the country68. Zanan covered topics that were not 
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only considered taboo by Iranian society but which also made the Islamic regime extremely 
uncomfortable. These included topics such as prostitution, domestic abuse and maternal custody 
along with modern interpretations of the Quran69. Despite its effort to remain moderate and 
unbiased, the publication provoked many reactions in Iran and there were many attacks on its 
offices by religious fundamentalists as well as the government.  
Similar to Sherkat, Taleghani was an active supporter of the Islamic Revolution and led 
rallies against the Shah during the Revolution. Her loyalty to the revolutionary cause, and her 
family pedigree, won her a seat in the first Parliament of the Islamic Republic in 197970. In the 
same year, she established the Iranian Islamic Women’s Institute, with the aim to improve 
women’s status by organizing literacy classes, informing women of their rights, offering them 
free legal advice, and providing vocational training in order to increase their financial 
independence71. She explains that, “The idea of setting up a women’s Islamic organization goes 
back to the time when I was imprisoned under the Shah. I understood then that women who 
belonged to the secular left were better organized and were even able to attract Muslim women. I 
was therefore convinced of the need for an organization to help women with legal and economic 
problems72.” 
However, Taleghani soon noticed that the new regime’s patriarchal discourse around 
women overlooked their contribution to the Revolution.73 While the leaders of the Islamic 
Revolution had urged women to take come out of their homes to advance the Revolution, they 
                                                 
69 Vakil, Women and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and Reaction, 121. 
70 Sciolino, Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran, 110.  
71Eric Hooglund, Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political and Social Transition in Iran since 1979, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2007), 62.  
72Azadeh Kian and Ethan Rundell, “Islamic Feminism in Iran: A New Form of Subjugation or the Emergence of 
Agency?” Critique Internationale (31 March 2010), www.cairn-int.info/article-E_CRII_046_0045--islamic-
feminism-in-iran-a-new-form-of-s.htm. 
73 Vakil, Women and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and Reaction, 85.  
 21 
now wanted women to be confined between four walls and serve their role as homemakers74. 
Taleghani, however, believed that the key role played by women during the Revolution qualified 
them for a more influential social and political role in the new regime75. Disappointed in the 
reality of the Islamic government, she famously said that “poverty and polygamy are the only 
things that poor women have obtained from the revolution76.”  
 While her organization ran successfully, Azam Taleghani realized the need to challenge 
the religious discourse around women in order to bring meaningful change to Iranian society. 
Historically, Islamic laws have been a result of male-dominated interpretations of the Quran 
which have often marginalized women. Taleghani’s publication, Payam-e Hajar, was the first 
magazine in Iran that worked within the framework of Islam to raise questions about the 
necessity of re-interpreting Islamic laws that favored polygamy and unequal rights to 
inheritance77. It is important to note that Payam-e Hajar was not a feminist publication in the 
Western sense - it promoted women as homemakers but still equal to men78. In other words, it 
showed that each gender has its own role that only it can fulfill which is why both men and 
women are equally important. This equality is evidenced by the fact that the publication, under 
Taleghani’s leadership, pushed the notion of women’s political leadership in a nation in which 
patriarchy was institutionalized and boldly declared herself a candidate for president in the 1997 
election.  
 With their individual approaches in mind, Sherkat and Taleghani embarked on a journey 
to expand the rights of women within the paradigm of Islam. In the following sections, we look 
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at how both reconciled Islam and feminism, opened up the domain of interpretation to women, 
and expanded the influence of women in the political arena. 
 
Islam and Feminism: Reconciliation  
 
Islam and feminism have long been considered antithetical to each other. In its July 2007 
issue, the Economist magazine printed an article about Iran titled the “Riddle Of Iran”79. Even 
though the article itself was solely about Iran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons, the 
accompanying photo on its was of a sea of women in black chadors. This tendency to use images 
of veiled women to represent the backwardness of the Iranian state and symbolize Islam’s 
oppression of women is a common phenomenon in the West. According to Leila Ahmed, the 
idea that men “beyond the borders of the civilized West80” oppressed women, was often used to 
assert the inherent superiority of the West and morally justify colonization. However, many 
scholars continue to believe that it is not possible to generate a feminist discourse within an 
Islamic paradigm because the underlying principles of equality are alien to Islam. 
 It is not surprising then that when the Islamic regime came to power in Iran, women 
became symbols of the anti-west movement and any association with the Western notion of 
feminism was considered as a betrayal to their Iranian and Islamic identity. This struggle of 
Iranian women to define their identity, under a regime that refused to grant them this freedom, 
led to a new form of discussion between Islam and feminism in the late 1980s and 1990s81. 
Unlike the past where feminism was largely equated with the West and secularism, in this new 
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era, Iranian women began to articulate a discourse of gender equality and social justice grounded 
in the Quran and other religious texts82. These women, like Sherkat and Taleghani, were deeply 
religious and had actively supported the clerics during the Islamic Revolution. The Iranian 
anthropologist, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, explains that while women like Sherkat and Taleghani “had 
played a crucial role in silencing other women’s voices83” during the Islamic Revolution, they  
soon “became disillusioned with the Islamic Republic's official discourse on women84” and 
began to challenge the regime’s conservative vision for women. In this section, we will look at 
Sherkat and Taleghani’s perception of the link between Islam and feminism and how it should be 
seen in the modern world.  
Sherkat, a devout Muslim, had supported the Islamic Revolution with the belief that it 
was only through Islam that we could achieve a society where men and women were equal 
contributors. While she acknowledged that the oppression of women did in fact exist in the 
Muslim world, she also believed that it had no basis in Islam85. Islamic sources, she argues, have 
been misinterpreted by men over the centuries in order to support “superstitions” and “jahilli 
[literally meaning ignorant] traditions86” along with a legal system that discriminated against 
women. These sources, according to Sherkat, can be interpreted to encourage gender equality 
and more rights for women87. In other words, gender equality can be achieved without discarding 
Islam and it was her goal to “go back to the depths of history to uncover the grounds for social 
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beliefs, to find the beginnings of the painful discriminations between two genders88” and “light a 
dark in the dark tunnels of stagnation and reification89.” 
Sherkat associates herself with “indigenous feminism90”, one that would speak to the 
traditional cultural and religious practices of Iranian women. Mir-Hosseini explains that in the 
current political climate in Iran, the solution to the problems of Iranian women must be in 
articulated in a local rather than Western language91. In other words, one must accept the social, 
political and economic realities of Iran and work within these parameters to educate women 
about their rights and help them broaden their sphere of influence. Sherkat explains how 
indigenous feminism allows women impact change by giving an example of the issue of 
abortion: 
At present, we may not be able to raise the issue of abortion in our society. But we 
could raise the issue of women’s rights to have control over their sexuality and 
fertility. This is a very important issue in a society where the traditional 
interpretation of the Islamic law gives a man the right to have sexual relations with 
his wife and decide when and how many children he may want to have, and the 
wife has to obey his wishes. Therefore, the demand for a woman to have control 
over her sexuality and fertility challenges the patriarchal rights of men within 
Sharia law92. 
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While Sherkat agrees with the spirit of feminism, she is reluctant to identify herself as a 
feminist because of the imperial connotations associated with the term and its political 
implications.93 Like Sherkat, most Iranian feminists have long had to navigate between their 
loyalty to both Iran and Islam, on the one hand, and their aspiration for women’s rights using the 
feminist discourse94. Sherkat believes that being associated with any particular label weakens the 
movement for women right’s as it causes divisions between groups where they should not exist. 
Sherkat says: “When I started Zanan...the word feminism was used as a swear word. I didn’t 
want to become known as a defender of feminism, I just wanted to talk about it. Feminism is still 
a new phenomenon here: we need to use it to create unity, to encourage women to protest 
together against gender inequality. That’s why I refuse to attach any adjective to the word, such 
as Islamic or secular. I haven’t got much time for labels95.” Sherkat’s attempt at balancing her 
Islamic and feminist identity is represented by the manner in which she carries her veil. She 
doesn’t wear the floor-length chador mandated by the Islamic Republic, but a maqna’h96 which 
only covers her head.  This action, though trivial in nature, is representative of Sherkat’s refusal 
to conform to Islamic regime’s concept of women and her determination to resist their control. 
Sherkat’s determination to not associate herself with any one type of feminism is one the 
main reasons that Zanan has been able to develop a new form of cooperation between secular 
and Islamic feminists within Iran97. Following the Islamic Revolution, most secular feminists 
were either repressed or exiled by the Islamic regime who refused to grant them access to 
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political power. With the lack of political power, one of the main reasons that these secular 
feminists remained relevant in Iran was through their writing. Sherkat invited secular feminists 
such as Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ebadi to write about women's issues, particularly legal 
reforms, in Zanan98. However, this relationship was not an easy one as many secular women 
were accused by their ideological companions of being sympathetic to the Islamic regime by 
supporting Islamic feminists99. Yet secular women, like Kar and Ebadi, felt that while only an 
end to theocracy would bring about real change, they could work with the Islamic feminists to 
bring meaningful reforms in Iran100. Kar explained that initially she was even reluctant to meet 
Sherkat quite wrongly believing that her own ideas could never resonate with a veiled religious 
woman101. However, her preconceived notions were immediately dispelled upon meeting Sherkat 
and Kar was convinced that Zanan had start a historic movement in Iran – one that would benefit 
women102. There is no doubt that secular feminists were put at ease by Sherkat’s progressive 
views as she believes that: “Women’s rights issues in Iran are so complicated that we must start 
from somewhere that we could agree with each other and work through until we arrive at areas 
of disagreement… Not to forget that beside secular women, we also have religious minorities 
and national minorities where the issue of feminism could mean different things for different 
women103.” By bringing together secular and Islamic feminists, Sherkat expanded her readership 
and consequentially the legal literacy and gender consciousness among women. 
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The difference was bridged not only between Islamic and secular feminists, but also 
Western and Iranian feminism. For Sherkat, one form of feminism was not better than the other 
and she promoted this belief through Zanan when she showed underlying similarities between 
the Iranian women's movement and Western feminist movements104. Zanan, for the first time, 
translated and printed classic feminist literature from the West and included writings and 
biographies along with photographs of non-Iranian and non-veiled Western women. For 
example, Zanan published a translation of an interview with Simone de Beauvoir, a French 
feminist, who wrote The Second Sex105. Unlike many religious women who dismiss Western 
feminism as alien and corrupt, Sherkat calls for a balanced appreciation of weaknesses and 
strengths of the Western feminism106. She notes: “We must all tolerate and respect each other's 
convictions. Even if we don't share the same philosophy, the same beliefs and thinking, we can 
and should work together107.” In one of Zanan’s issue, Sherkat printed a portrait of filmmaker 
Rakhshan Bani-E’temad with her hair only half-covered in a fashionable scarf while leaning on a 
camera along with poems of a prominent poet Forugh Forrokazad – who was known for 
sexually-rich and strongly feminist peoms108. In this way, Zanan played a profound role in 
reducing the Iranian phobia about Western ideas and showing that women face similar problems 
across the globe.  
Similar to Sherkat, Taleghani supported the Islamic Revolution believing that it would 
not only rid Iran of the tyrannical rule of the Shah but also give women their rightful place in 
society. What this rightful place entailed was never publicly discussed but most assumed that the 
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issue would work out itself once the Revolution was over. It was not until after the Islamic 
Republic had been established that women like Taleghani realized that the regime’s idea of 
gender was radically different than theirs and although the state called itself an Islamic Republic, 
its principles and laws were not really Islamic109. Taleghani refused to conform to the secondary 
status attributed to women by the Islamic regime and questioned the conservative forces within 
the clerical establishment. For her, feminism became a movement whose objective was to end 
gender discrimination and to create equality of opportunity for men and women as found in 
Islam110. She explains: “Women have a common fate. It is historically and specifically true that 
marginalized groups including women have revolted against their oppression. The Qur'an 
approves of our movement. The problem is not Islam, the problem is men111.”  
However, unlike Sherkat, Taleghani holds a more traditional view of women and their 
role in society. While Western feminism seeks to make women equal with men, the feminism 
propagated by Taleghani gives women unique roles in society and culture but does not make 
them inferior to men. In other words, for Taleghani, women’s evolution and identity is different 
from men but the difference is necessary in order to maintain balance within society112. “ I 
believe the heterosexual family relationship is necessary for the continuation of a healthy society 
but I also believe that there should be equal relationship between men and women within this 
family relationship, especially that the role of mother in the family is very important.113”This 
belief that motherhood was important in order for society to function highlights Taleghani’s 
larger thought process where social problems are prioritized over women’s problems. She 
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admits: “I believe that in our country women’s problems are secondary to political ones. What 
our people need is a correct analysis. Women are part of the society, and when its problems are 
solved, women’s issues will be solved114.” While this may seem like a conservative opinion to 
many, in a regime dominated by dogmatic beliefs, this was indeed progressive. 
While the Taleghani and Sherkat’s idea of feminism differed from one another, it was 
largely rooted in Islam. Both women believed that Islam, in its true essence, promoted gender 
equality and it was only the distorted version of it that was applied in Iran. It was important for 
feminism, as Sherkat highlights, to be translated in a local language that could be understood by 
most Iranian, men and women unlike. Taking Western feminism and applying it to the Iranian 
context would only exacerbate the mistrust between the two spheres of thought. However, 
understanding the struggle of Western feminists and linking it with the struggles of Iranian 
women, as Sherkat did through Zanan, increased the chances of cooperation and progression. 
What Sherkat and Taleghani believed is that one does not need to get rid of Islam in order to 
secure rights for women - in fact, it is in Islam that one can find these rights.  
 
Reinterpreting the Quran 
 
The role of women in an Islamic society was one of the most controversial issues that 
emerged in the modern era as Islamic societies faced immense criticism for their treatment of 
women particularly the existence of social seclusion, the practice of polygamy, and legal 
discrimination. The response of most modern Islamic reformers was to acknowledge that the 
oppression of women did in fact exist in the Muslim world, but it had no basis in the Quran. 
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Mohammed Arkoun (1928-2010), one of the most influential secular scholar of Islamic studies, 
believes that discrimination against women was a result of selective interpretations of Quranic 
verses115. The Islamic jurists, according to Arkoun, used Quranic verses to provide legitimacy to 
traditional practices in order to maintain a patriarchal society116. In other words, many scholars 
like Arkoun, argued that the Quranic verses used to justify such practices had been 
misinterpreted in order to support a male-dominant society along with a legal system that 
discriminated against women. As evidence, they put forward the Quran as progressive text that 
historically improved the status of women117. Compared to the 7th century Arabia where female 
infanticide was common and women were given no inheritance rights, Quran, they argued 
emphasized the spiritual equality of all Muslims, specified a woman's right to inherit wealth, and 
set limits on the practice of polygamy118.  Although there is no definite conclusion on whether 
Islam actually improved the status of women, most of the scholarship does indeed see many 
Quranic verses regarding women as progressive for the time119.   
Like most modern scholars, Shahla Sherkat and Azam Taleghani saw the re-interpretation 
of the Quran as the starting point of change in regards to women’s rights. Both advanced a 
modernist exegesis of the Quran, particularly the chapter on women (Al-Nisa), to arrive at a new 
concept of gender relations. While Taleghani engaged in the interpretation herself, Sherkat edited 
the works of other writers and published them in Zanan. Her views can be discerned by 
analyzing the works of these writers and through her interview.  Both women focused more on 
considering the patriarchal culture that existed in the 7th century Arabia and its impact in shaping 
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the long-term interpretations of the verses. As it would be difficult to address all issues regarding 
women mentioned in the Quran, we will focus here on two key issues: the question of gender 
equality and the practice of polygamy. We will consider verses that address each of these issues 
in the Quran and Sherkat and Taleghani’s explanation of these issues in line with their view of 
the Quran.  
Sherkat firmly believed that discriminatory laws against women could not possibly 
change without a reinterpretation of the Quran and she offered Islamic readings of gender 
equality and justice120. The historian, Afsaneh Najmabadi, highlights that: “at the center of 
Zanan’s revisionist approach is a radical decentering of the clergy from the domain of 
interpretation, and the placing of woman as interpreter and her needs as grounds for 
interpretation121.” Among the inequalities Sherkat addressed are laws related to divorce, 
guardianship of children, women’s ability to act as witness in the court of law and her role in the 
family.  While there were many individuals and groups that worked to reinterpret Quranic verses 
in face of modernization, Zanan was unique in that it intended to use this strategy to bring about 
cultural change and social power for women122.  
According to Sherkat, the Quran is open to interpretation and historically this 
interpretation has been dominated by male jurists who have advanced patriarchal readings and 
then translated them in to Islamic law123. The restriction of Quranic interpretation to a few 
chosen clerics has led, she argures, absolutist vision of Islam and underplays the value of 
interpretation in the process. In one of her interviews, she emphasizes that stringent rules such as 
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women should wear a black veil or should be restricted to the home are not mandated by the 
Quran but by the clerics who misinterpreted it124. One of the most prominent legal scholar whose 
work was published by Sherkat for over a decard in Zanan, Hojatoleslam Sayyid 
Mohsen Saidzadeh, advance this view: “For 1,400 years, discriminatory interpretations of 
women have been produced; these aren’t religion, but interpretations of religion. I defend my 
position against those who say I am questioning religion, I do not question religion, only 
erroneous religious thoughts125.” Since interpretations can vary from time and place, there is no 
one interpretation that is absolutely true and so women, Sherkat believed, who have historically 
been excluded from the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, can and should be able to reinterpret 
verses for themselves instead of appealing to male clerics.  
For example, if one considers the issue of wife-beating in Iran one can see, Sherkat 
argues, that is largely a male interpretations of the word Daraba126.  Daraba is an Arabic term 
that is traditionally interpreted as beating – however, in one of its issues, Zanan argued that this 
is a mistranslation of the Quran’s Arabic and Daraba can also mean “resting, avoiding, walking, 
preventing, staying home127.” The Quranic verse states: “ But those [wives] from whom you fear 
arrogance - [first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike 
them. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them.” Here we see that the term 
Daraba is translated as strike– but Sherkat argues that this is one of the many translations of the 
word that can be applied. The clerics forget that the verse emphasizes other measures first but 
conservative forces have ignored all progressive translation of the verse, and instead promoted 
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wife beating, which Sherkat deems as a pre-Islamic custom128. Sherkat not only challenged this 
practice on a theological level but also advanced social changes through her journalism. She 
published an article in Zanan titled, “Sir, Have You Ever Beaten Your Wife?” which included 
interviews with women who were abused and men who abused them in order to acknowledge the 
presence of wife-beating in Iran and make it a topic of debate129.  
Sherkat also emphasizes that since the Quran is rooted in a historical certain context, it is 
also essential to look at it while keeping that particular context in mind130. In other words, it is 
important to acknowledge that it is closely related, culturally and linguistically, to 7th century 
Arabia where it was revealed over a period of twenty years131. Thus, for example, when the 
Quran says that women should inherit half of that of men, we must consider the position of 
women in 7th century Arabia who at the time were not allowed to inherit at all. The Quranic text 
itself may say that women should inherit half of what men should but, but the core of its message 
points out to the progressiveness of the Quran.  In this manner of thinking, Sherkat echoes the 
idea of a renowned Egyptian reformer, Abu Zayd, who wrote: “The position of women expressed 
in the Quran, in general is historically progressive. It could easily be reinterpreted according to 
what its reveals by its historical and contextual significance in order to unfold its implication 
and, therefore, to foster the basic principle of equality inherent in the concept of justice132.” 
Similarly, certain punishments today are considered Islamic, which if one looks historically, 
have no basis in Islam. For example, in the Quran it says, “As for the thief, both male and 
female, cut off their hand (Surah 5: 38)”. Traditionalists see chopping off the hands of thieves as 
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an Islamic punishment. However, if you take historically informed approach of Islam, you can 
understand that this form of punishment has no origins in Islam but is actually rooted in the pre-
Islamic Arabian society. Since this punishment has no ground in Islam itself, and is rooted in the 
social and historical context of 7th century Arabia, if this punishment is abolished in a particular 
Islamic society today, it does not mean that the society itself is un-Islamic. According to Sherkat, 
if Quranic passages are not understood in the proper historical context, but are literally 
transferred to modern times, the message will be misunderstood133.  
So for Sherkat, several traditions should be considered limited to the 7th century and not 
applicable to modern societies and it is a profound mistake to consider the Quran as a book of 
laws because this would imply that the Sharia is binding for all Muslims and all times134. The 
Quran provided solutions to social problems that existed in 7th century Arabia, but that does not 
mean that those solutions are valid today since the socio-historical context has shifted so 
drastically. Since Islam, she argued, made sense for “all people in all countries at all times135,” 
the verses that were applicable then did not have to be applicable in today’s world. God’s words 
had to reinterpreted, updated so that they were applicable to modern life. Iran, for example, 
permitted citizens to marry at puberty, which it defined as nine for girls and fifteen for boys. 
“But people died younger in the seventh century. Today these designations are inappropriate136.”  
Sherkat strongly held the view that if a practice, such as polygamy, has detrimental effects on the 
society it should be outlawed. This is because the purpose of almost all verses in the Quran, 
according to Sherkat, is to establish justice and if the practice based on these verses becomes 
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unjust – it is time to abandon this practice. Justice in this sense refers to divine justice since all 
people are deemed equal in the eyes of God. 
Another important aspect pertaining the rights of women in the Quran is their equality 
with men. There is no doubt that Quran emphasizes the spiritual equality of men and women and 
their responsibility to fulfill the religious duties of Islam. This spiritual equality is clearly 
mentioned in many verses such as: “The believing men and women are allies of one another. 
They advocate righteousness and forbid evil, they observe the Prayer and give the obligatory 
charity, and they obey God and His messenger. These will be showered by God's mercy. God is 
Almighty, Most Wise (Surah 9:71)” and “As for those who lead a righteous life, male or female, 
while believing, they enter Paradise; without the slightest injustice (Surah 4:124).” What these 
verses show is that in the eyes of God, the authors argue, that men and women are created as 
equal and have the same duties towards Him.  However, the Quran does ascribe different social 
roles to men and women, roles that often appear to discriminatory in the modern world such as 
the Quranic verse that casts men as “the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has 
given the one more strength than the other and because they support them from their means 
(Surah 4:34).”  
Sherkat believes that the spiritual equality of men and women mentioned several times in 
the Quran is evidence that in God’s eyes there is no moral difference between the two genders137. 
Zanan promotes that view that there is no distinction made regarding how men or women will be 
treated in the afterlife nor does God assign each gender different religious duties and it would be 
irrational to argue that the Quran advocates a principle of gender inequality when God clearly 
states the spiritual equality of all Muslims in the verse: “As for those who lead a righteous life, 
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male or female, while believing, they enter Paradise; without the slightest injustice (Surah 
4:124).” Gender inequality as it exists today in Islamic societies has much more to do with the 
patriarchal context where historically women were financially dependent on men and did not 
have the opportunities to gain experience or develop their character and intellectual abilities 138. 
However, this does not apply to contemporary times where women are capable of being 
economically independent. Sherkat said: “The Qur’an has not banned women from becoming 
judges. This prohibition was initiated in the history of jurisprudence and in the opinions of the 
previous religious authorities, whose ideas on women probably were shaped by the examples of 
their own wives or female relatives whom they generalized to the entire female population139.”  
 Like Sherkat, Taleghani also engaged in reinterpretations of the Quran in order to 
challenge long-standing traditions such as polygamy. Polygamy, in Islamic tradition, is the 
practice according to which one man may have several wives simultaneously. Like many other 
practices in Islamic tradition, it is known that polygamy was a pre-Islamic practice that 
continued in Islam140. Prior to the 18th century, most Islamic scholarship considered polygamy as 
a practice that was allowed and there was hardly any discussion over its legitimacy in the Quran. 
However, in the modern era, polygamy has become a widely debated topic. Most scholarship 
refers to two Qur'anic verses that address polygamy: Surah 4:3 and Surah 4:129. The first verse 
is part of the passage that addresses the issue of orphans, where the Quran says: 
 Give orphans the property which belongs to them. Do not exchange their valuable for 
worthless things of cheat them of their possessions; for this would surely be a grievous sin.  
If you fear that you will not act justly towards the orphans, marry such as seem good to 
                                                 
138 Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran, 315. 
139Roksana Bahramitash, Gender in Contemporary Iran: Pushing the Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 2011), 29. 
140Michael Cook, The New Cambridge History of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 307.  
 37 
you, two, three four; but if you fear you will not be equitable, then only one, or what your 
right hands own; so it is likelier you will not be partial. But if you fear that you cannot 
maintain equality among them, marry one only or any-slave girl you may own. This will 
make it easier for you to avoid injustice (Surah 4:2). 
 
 The second verses addresses men:  
“You are never able to be just and fair as between your wives, even if it your ardent desire; 
but do not turn away (from a woman) altogether, so as to leave (as it were) hanging (in the 
air) (Surah 4:129).”  
 
In traditional Islamic scholarship, this verse is interpreted as giving men the permission to have 
more than one wife as long as they are able to provide for their basic material needs.  
Azam Taleghani was the first to publish an article in 1992 which challenged the 
legalization of polygamy and proposed a new interpretation of the Quranic verses. According to 
Taleghani, Islamic scholars have not considered the underlying historical and textual context of 
the verse, which shows that polygamy was a solution to a profound social problem that emerged 
in the 7th century141. The verse, she highlights, was revealed following the Battle of Uhud where 
the Muslims lost nearly ten percent of their army. The death of these male soldiers left behind 
many widows and orphans who, in the 7th century Arabia, were often turned into slaves and 
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denied their inheritance142. Hence, Taleghani argues, the Quranic verse was revealed and 
provided the early Muslims with a solution to the problem of orphans through the practice of 
polygamy, which allowed the male survivors to take up additional wives in order to provide 
physical and financial security for them143. Taleghani says: “The analysis of the Quranic verse on 
polygamy shows that this right is recommended in some specific cases and exclusively in order 
to meet a social need in view of expanding social justice144.” 
In addition to addressing social needs, Taleghani argues, the Quranic verses pertaining to 
polygamy have also placed the condition of equality145. Taleghani argues that the condition for 
polygamy is impartiality in the treatment of their wives yet the Quran recognized that it is 
impossible to treat all wives equally146. When two verses  - “But if you fear that you cannot 
maintain equality among them, marry only one (Surah 4:2)” and “You are never able to be just 
and fair as between your wives, even if it is your ardent desire (Surah 4:129).” - are read 
together, one can see that polygamy is that prohibited in the Quran because a man cannot be 
equally just in his treatment of wives. Taleghani pointed to the fact that even the Prophet 
Muhammad was not able to practice this tenet of equality and so it would be unlikely for an 
average man to achieve this either. This contradiction, according to Taleghani, shows that the 
Quran discourages polygamy and a man should marry only one wife.  
Polygamy, Taleghani argues, does not hold in the modern world because unlike the 7th 
century, there exists a modern state system with social institutions to assist all families. In other 
words, while polygamy was applicable and had good effects in the early Muslim community, in 
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modern society, polygamy leads to more problems147. Citing a national census of the population, 
she points on to the fact that there are more men today than women in Iran and polygamy along 
with high costs of marriage essentially deprive other men of marriage148. The author concludes, 
“It has been shown that in reality it is pleasure rather than charity that motivates men to become 
polygamous149”. Taleghani strongly held since polygamy increased social problem rather than 
solve them, it was no longer applicable in today’s world.   
 Although both Sherkat and Taleghani differed in their approach, both their interpretations 
on the verses regarding women recognize that the Quran inherently advocates for the principle of 
gender equality. Both Sherkat and Taleghani put forward the common belief that the Quran with 
regards to women provided a great step forward from the 7th century Arabian society where 
Arabs lived in ignorance and barbarism. In my view, what appears to be true is that the Quran 
did prescribe some improvements for women and some limitations. Improvements were not 
revolutionary and a majority were reforms of previously existing practices such as polygamy and 
inheritance laws. However, a clear Quranic reform was seen in various aspects such as the 
outlawing of female infanticide and dowry. What Sherkat and Taleghani’s analysis shows us is 
that if understood in their socio-historical and thematic concepts, these Quranic verses can be 
used to support reform in modern Islamic societies. As mentioned, practices such as polygamy 
no longer have to be considered as a part of being a Muslim as it is shown that these concepts 
can be re-interpreted in modern times. Similarly, their analysis also shows that the principle of 
gender equality has roots in the Quran. What is just for one society is not just for another, so 
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while male guardianship was due to the economic subordination of women in 7th century Arabia, 
it is no longer valid.  
 
Political Advancement of Women 
 
During the Islamic Revolution, women came out of seclusion and onto the streets as a 
political force and Khomeini praised them as “the lion-hearted ones whose great efforts saved 
Islam from the captivity of the foreigners and who alongside men secured the victory of 
Islam150.” Women led many of the protests against the Shah and organized grass-root movements 
that were essential in the success of the Revolution. This high level of participation, particularly 
in a religious revolution, not only increased their sense of power and self-confidence but also 
expanded their political consciousness as women began to discuss their potential social and 
political role in the future Islamic government.  
However, once the Islamic regime was in power, women were largely sidelined women 
from the political sphere in Iran. By law, there is no restriction on accessibility of Iranian women 
to high positions in the government. However, in reality, the patriarchal culture grounded in a 
particular understanding of Islam has made it increasingly difficult for women to access power. 
The ex-President of Iran famously called on Iranian women to home to their families and focus 
on their “primary” responsibility of raising children151. 
For the first decade after the Revolution, there were only three female deputies out of two 
hundred and sixty-eight in the parliament. Female parliamentarians occupied 1.5% of the seats in 
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first three parliaments152. But their presence doubled to reach a total of 9 in the 1992 elections 
which was 3.3% of the seats153, and is up to 17, roughly 6%, in the 2016 election154. Although 
women’s presence in parliament and other decision-making bodies has been limited, women like 
Sherkat and Taleghani have refused to remain accept this secondary status and have found new 
ways to increase women’s influence in the political sphere. In this section, we will look at the 
role that Sherkat and Taleghani have played in expanding the Islamic movement politically. 
While Sherkat engages in theoretical debates of women’s rights, she firmly believes that 
it is important to translate these ideas politically. She is not a political figure herself but has used 
her journal, Zanan, as an activist platform to influence political debates that center around 
women. Perhaps her most significant contribution in the political sphere was her campaign in 
support of the Presidential Candidate, Muhammad Khatami, during the 1997 Presidential 
elections in Iran155. Unlike his opponent, Nateq Nuri, who ran on a conservative platform, 
Khatami appeared as a progressive candidate who understood that the clerical leadership must 
evolve with the social and political realities of Iran in order to remain politically relevant156. This 
evolvement included a progressive view towards women’s rights: “We should have a 
comprehensive view of the role of women and before anything else, should not regard women as 
second-class citizens157.” Khatami understood the power and importance of the female vote and 
consciously appealed to them with his relatively flexible version of Islam. He found immense 
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support amongst young who sought more social freedom and believed it would be easier to fight 
for women’s issues under his presidency158.  
Determined to support his reformist vision, Sherkat printed an in-depth interview with 
Khatami and put him on the cover of Zanan when he was still considered a conservative 
candidate. In the interview with Sherkat, Khatami recognized that women’s issues were 
controlled by a “male chauvinist attitude159” and that it was important to increase their presence 
in the in political, social and religious forums in order to eliminate the male supremacy. In 
addition to revealing his goals regarding women, he also revealed details about his relationship 
with his wife and daughters160. It is important to understand that in Iran women and daughters 
are not spoken about in public by men as they represent a private aspect of life. Hence’s 
Khatami’s interview, led by Sherkat’s questions, made him appear more personable and gender 
conscious than he may have actually been and mobilized the female voters so much so that they 
became the largest single element responsible for his victory. Sherkat admitted the magazine’s 
activist role in political affairs: “I keep careful track of all the unfair things legislators say about 
women. And then, when they run for office, I publish all the quotes alongside their pictures so 
women will know not to vote for them.161”. Through Khatami's victory, Iranian women voiced 
their rejection of the discriminatory policies and practices of the conservative elite. 
Whether Khatami’s election had a positive impact on women’s rights, as had been 
expected by Sherkat, is debatable. During his tenure as President, thirteen reform-minded women 
were elected as members of the Sixth Majlis, the Iranian term for Parliament, and formed a 
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legislative bloc that came to be referred to as the Women's Faction162. The goal of the Women's 
Faction was to amend discriminatory legislation and they did manage to make a few reforms. 
Firstly, the Women's Faction proposed a bill that would allow single women to study abroad and 
allow them to apply for government grants to support their education163. This bill had been 
rejected by the last two Majlis’, however, since this Majlis was relatively more reform-minded 
than its predecessors - the bill was passed in 2000.  In addition to this, the Women’s faction was 
also able to increase custody rights for women. Since the Revolution, women were granted 
custody rights over females till they were seven years old and males until they were two, at 
which point full custody rights devolved to the father. The changes made to this law allowed the 
women to have custody over both male and female children until the age of seven. Although this 
change was not incremental, it still managed to push the boundary a step further. Lastly, the 
Women's Faction was able to raise the minimum legal age for girls to marry from nine to 
thirteen164. Zanan supported these women by publishing articles about the measures they were 
working to pass while at the same time criticizing conservative women in the Majlis who 
continued to support the traditionalists.  
As Shahla Sherkat, and her fellow reformers learned, however, this era of reform under 
Khatami was inconsistent and relatively limited in the changes it brought forth. Although 
reformist parliamentarians dominated the Majlis during the reform era, the conservative-
dominated Guardian Council, which is charged with approving all legislation to ensure 
compatibility with Iran’s Constitution and Islamic principles, used its veto power to block reform 
efforts within the Majlis165. One of the key example of this was the proposal for the state to ratify 
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CEDAW. Although the Majlis collectively voted in favor of ratifying CEDAW, the Guardian 
Council refused to take up the issue deeming it was un-Islamic. The Guardian Council justified 
their rejection of CEDAW by arguing that while in Islam women and men are equal in the eyes 
of God, they have different social roles and duties166. In other words, while women are spiritually 
equal to men, they are not charged with the same level of social, economic, and political 
responsibility, and thus cannot be given power in these spheres. The CEDAW’s notion of 
equality in all spheres of life, according to the Guardian Council, was at odds with Islam. It is 
important to note that the Women's Faction did not present the case for CEDAW in secular terms 
but rather stressed its compatibility with Islam by invoking Islamic ideals such as egalitarianism 
and humanitarianism167. The Guardian Council’s refusal to seriously consider CEDAW 
represented the unwillingness of conservative clerics to accept legislation that might shake the 
misogynistic foundations of the Islamic state.  
While Sherkat was politically active through her journalism, Taleghani fought directly for 
her share of power in the Islamic regime.  In the Presidential Election of 1997, Taleghani boldly 
nominated herself as a candidate for Presidency. According to Article 115 of the Iranian 
Constitution of 1979, “The president must be elected from among religious and political 
personalities possessing the following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; 
administrative capacity and resourcefulness; a good past record; trustworthiness and piety; and 
convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official 
madhhab (religion) of the country168.” The article uses the term rejal, which essentially means 
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political personalities in Persian.169 However, the traditional understanding of this term considers 
political personalities to be male and hence the rule has been that only a male could run for 
president of Iran170. This understanding of this term went unchallenged for almost two decades 
until Azam Taleghani announced her intention to be a candidate for this position.  
In debating the Council’s decision against women’s right to participate in political life, 
Taleghani argued that the term rejal is applied to both men and women in the Quran. She 
explains that: “Article 115 has listed several qualifications for the president, one of them is being 
a political personality...But that does not mean men only171.” Taleghani argued that since women 
hold other public offices, they are also considered to be political personalities and cannot be 
barred from being candidates for the presidency. Taleghani also made her case in religious terms 
and highlighted that “there are sentences in the Quran that explain the basis of political activity 
by women. Islam never wanted to imprison women. On the contrary, it says women should be 
able to act  and feel responsibility in order to raise children...  but since the Government has 
always been in the hands of men, they never wanted to inform women about that172.” Her 
argument in Islamic terms and her clerical family background provided her with a level of 
legitimacy that few other women could have achieved at that time. While she was an insider, a 
supporter of the Revolution, who not only wore a black chador and spoke in Islamic terms, she 
also believed that it was essential to have female representation in key departments where 
national policies were decided. This view resonated with Sherkat who also supported 
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Taleghani’s candidacy by publishing articles on the Islamic right and obligation of women along 
with interviews of Taleghani in Zanan.  
In the end, the Guardian Council rejected her candidacy and refused to provide a written 
explanation for her disqualification by arguing that it is against religious law and might threaten 
national security. However, it was quite clear that the Council did not approve of Taleghani’s 
candidacy due to its discrimination against women. Even after her disqualification, Taleghani 
continued her struggle and visited several religious seminaries in Iran in order to ask respected 
male clerics for their interpretation of the word rejal173. She eventually got several clerics to 
support her position that a woman could indeed be president of Iran: “Some of the clerics said 
that women absolutely could not become President...but one ayatollah said that men and women, 
and, I’m sorry, even hermaphrodites could become President174”. She highlighted the 
contradictory clerical views on this matter in her journal, Payam-e Hajar, and showed that there 
was no consensus among the religious elite on whether a woman could or could not run for 
president. This lack of collective opinion, Taleghani asserted, meant that there was space for 
debate and she was determined to bring this debate into the public sphere pressure on Iran’s 
political and religious elites to make changes175. “I was told I wasn’t a religious or political 
personality and that why I couldn’t run for President,” she said. “But it was a victory. I was not 
disqualified because I was a woman. That proves that a woman can run for President176. It is 
likely that Taleghani knew that the Guardian Council would reject her candidacy but she 
considered it her religious duty to question the status quo and carve a path for other women to 
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follow177.  Indeed, following her example, other women participated in presidential campaigns 
and in elections for ministerial posts and regional governorships. In the 2001 presidential 
election, forty-seven women registered as candidates and in 2005, the number had soared up to a 
hundred178.  
The Gaurdian Council, shortly before the 2009 Presidential Election, finally declared that 
the term rejal was gender neutral and that women were not banned from submitting their 
nomination. The spokesman for the Council of Guardians, Abass-Ali Kadkhodayi, said in a press 
conference that the “council has never interpreted the term political rejal...... In the past female 
candidates registered to run for president as there is no specific limitation on the matter... The 
Council of Guardians has never arrived at its position based on an individual’s gender, and 
whenever a woman was not qualified (to become a presidential candidate) it was because she 
lacked the necessary qualifications179.” Here we see that while the Guardian Council admitted 
that there was no legal hindrance for female candidates, women were just not qualified enough to 
be considered suitable for the post of Presidency180. It has been eight years since this statement 
was made and to this day, the Guardian Council continues to reject all female candidates. 
However, the fact that they found it necessary to clarify the term highlights the level of 
Taleghani’s influence and the impact the women’s movement had in Iran. Mona Tajali writes: 
“the Council of Guardian’s eventual clarification of this contentious term demonstrates the extent 
of women’s strategic efforts and pressuring on state elites, as well as some of the pressuring and 
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negotiations that occurred between the religious women‟s groups and various reformist clerical 
figures181.” 
The religious and political elites could no longer ignore the voices of women, like 
Taleghani and Sherkat, who strategically put pressure on them to reform Islamic legislation 
regarding women. Both Sherkat and Taleghani made sure that despite the effort of the ruling 
regime, women remained relevant in the political sphere. While Sherkat did this by ensuring that 
Presidential candidates understood the important of catering to the female voters, Taleghani 
directly proclaimed herself as a nominee for President against the wishes of the Islamic regime. 
Together, they kept the political arena opened for Iranian women at a time when women were 




“Faced by an apparent choice between the devil of those who want to impose patriarchal 
interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts, and the deep blue sea of those who pursue a neo-
colonialist hegemonic global project in the name of enlightenment and feminism, those of us 
committed to achieving justice for women and a just world have no other option than to bring 
Islamic and feminist perspectives together. Otherwise, Muslim women’s quest for equality will 
remain hostage to different political forces and tendencies, as it was in the twentieth century and 




We have, in the limited scope of this thesis, touched on key issues that are prominent in 
Islamic feminism. There are three key lessons to take from this thesis. 
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First, it highlights, how some of the strongest critics of Islamic orthodoxy exist within the 
Muslim community themselves. Sherkat and Taleghani, wearing their veils, may portray the 
image of conservative supporters, but they have not only shown a profound understanding of the 
challenges Islam faces in the modern world but have also dared to radically reinterpret the Quran 
in face of the long-standing orthodox interpretation. Although both Sherkat and Taleghani came 
from different background and used different means to promote their cause, they played a crucial 
role in placing Quran in the world, in effect, advancing the Islamic feminist movement.  
Zanan’s success as major voice for reform in Iran is largely credited to Sherkat’s 
leadership and her ability to navigate through sensitive topics while also bridging the gap 
between women of diverse backgrounds. “Doing journalism in countries like ours—where...the 
system thinks if you say anything it’s going to fall apart—it’s like being a trapeze artist.” Zanan 
is evidence of the fact that bringing gender debate and women’s issues to the forefront, engaging 
in theological reinterpretations, and opening up to global feminism can raise awareness and 
eventually bring about long-term change. Sherkat has used journalism not only to raise 
awareness amongst its readership on key social and legal issues but also to influence the political 
sphere by mobilizing women to support progressive candidates and legislations.  
Taleghani, similarly, is a prime example of a woman who has single-handedly advanced 
the right’s of woman as a political activist. By declaring herself as a Presidential Candidate not 
once but several times, she has exhibited resilience and a firm belief that Muslim women can and 
should be present in high positions in the government. The Islamic regime has been forced to 
respond to her struggles and while women candidate continue to be rejected, their rejection, at 
least officially, is not based on gender.  
 50 
Secondly, the extent to which Sherkat and Taleghani were persecuted for their views 
sheds light on the power of the traditional elites within Iran and their general intolerance towards 
new views on Islam. As Sherkat’s readership grew in Iran, she began to receive letters from 
conservative men who are opposing the reforms, accusing them of destabilizing family 
relationships. She responded: “Our aim is not to destabilize families and family relationship. Our 
aim is to bring about equality between women and men. If men are oppressive in a variety of 
ways, that does not mean that women must be silent against different forms of oppression182.” 
Although she was warned several times for promoting content that “compromised the mental 
health of its readers by providing morally questionable information183” she continued to publish 
work on the women’s issues and discriminatory laws. Zanan’s public presence and increasing 
number of followers became a threat to Islamic state and, in 2009, after 16 years and 152 issues, 
Zanan was shut down forever. Sherkat says it best: “the coldness of those seeking redemption did 
not cool off our enthusiasm, the cynicism of the times did not dull our pain, and the threats did 
not incline out turmoil to submission and abjectness. Our present independence is the sweet fruit 
of those days184.” 
Like Sherkat, Taleghani faced several obstacles due to her political activism. When she 
reached out to foreign networks in order to raise funds and support her journal, Payam-e Hajar, 
her employees were interrogated and harassed and her own passport was confiscated185. 
Taleghani was also placed under constant surveillance by government agents and has been 
prohibited from going abroad on numerous occasions186. “I won’t be silent. And even if I remain 
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silent, the women won’t be silent. Our movement will continue.187” Both Sherkat and 
Taleghani’s life serve as proof of the reluctance of the Islamic regime to new modes of thinking 
and the monopoly the traditional elites hold over the interpretation of Islamic texts.  
The last and the most important lesson is that, as both these women show, the Quran can 
be used as a source of reformation in the Islamic societies. Both Sherkat and Taleghani show that 
while an orthodox version of Islam finds support for gender inequality in the Quran, it is the 
Quran that also mandates these concepts and practices as outdated for modern times. The biggest 
challenge facing modern Islamic societies is therefore to open up the Quran to a rigorous re-
interpretation – an interpretation that would inevitably challenge the authority of classical 
Islamic jurisprudence. Without a reconstruction of the basic principles derived from the Quran, 
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